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POINT I
RESPONDING TO THE STATES POINT I, THIS COURT SHOULD
DECIDE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO
PROPERLY INSTRUCT REGARDING THE PROPER MENS REA FOR
THIRD DEGREE FELONY AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.
The State takes the position that, because the defendant briefed a case, State

v. O'Bannon, 2012 UT App. 71, 274 P.3d 992, which does not directly address the
crime of aggravated assault, that this Comi should simply avoid, ignore, and
abstain from addressing the issues raised by State v. O'Bannon in relation to the
charge of aggravated assault. Br. St. 25 - 26, 29 - 35. It argues that since the
defendant makes no explicit argument that O'Bannon directly overrules prior case
law, this Court should not consider it. Br. St. 29 - 30.
The State is incorrect in that regard. The O 'Bannon case was decided very
near the start of trial, but it had not been reported yet. The Comi of Appeals ruled
that at least in physical child abuse cases, a person must intend, not just to engage
in the conduct, but intend to produce a particular result.

It is the defendant's

position that that rubric should be applied to the facts of this case with respect to
the aggravated assault. This Court held that the State's argument and authorities
failed to suppmi the sort of "eggshell plaintiff' doctrine, as is applicable in tort
law, in a criminal case. 0 'Bannon,

~

3 8. It held to be en-oneous the instruction

that the injurer takes his victim as he finds him regardless of his intent to cause a
certain amount of harm: "... the State had the burden of proving that O'Bannon
1
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intended his conduct to cause the victim serious physical injury or of proving that
O'Bannon knew that his conduct was reasonably certain to cause the victim serious
physical injury." Id.,

~

23. The Court held this to be inconsistent with philosophy

of the criminal code, which ".. .include "[f]orbidding and prevent[ing] the
commission of offenses" and "[d]efining adequately the conduct and mental state
which constitute each offense and safeguard conduct that is without fault from
condemnation as criminal. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104(1)-(2)." Id.,

~

30; Br.

Aplt. 28 - 29.
The State is entirely accurate that authorities hold that "the mental state
required for assault is "'intent, knowledge, or recklessness."'

Br. St. 30. That

however does not negate the validity of the defendant's argument that instruction
3 8 (R.921) is effoneous, prejudicing the defendant in failing to require the jury to
find that he acted with intent, or knowledge, or recklessness with respect to the
result of his conduct, i.e., that he intended, knew, or was reckless with respect to
the use of deadly force in causing the alleged victim serious bodily injury. The
absence of language to that effect justified affesting judgment or granting his
motion for new trial on the facts of this case.
The defendant does not disagree with the authority cited by the State, State

v. Howell, 554 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1976), State v. McElhaney, 579 P.2d 328, 328-29
(Utah 1978); State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75 (Utah 1981) insofar as they go. However
2
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even the State concedes that where a second degree felony aggravated assault is
charged under Utah Code Ann. § 76 - 5 - 103 (1) (a), specific intent is required.
See Br. St. 32-33, citing State v. Mangum, 2013 UT App 292, 318 P.3d 250 (per

curiam).

Inasmuch as Mangum was convicted under the section for using a

dangerous weapon, the defendant contends that the statements in the Mangum case
regarding the section under which the defendant was convicted must be considered
to be non-binding dicta.
0 'Bannon considered the case law and affirmed the defendant's position in

this case.

(State v.)Gonzales (2002 UT App 256, 56 P.3d 969) and (State v.)
Hamblin (676 P.2d 376 (Utah 1983) do not support the application of
the eggshell plaintiff doctrine in a criminal case. We agree that
Gonzales and Hamblin are instructive in that these cases recognize a
basis under Utah law for holding a defendant culpable for causing
death even when other factors contributed to the victim's death. See
generally Hamblin, 676 P.2d at 379; Gonzales, ilil 20-21. In this case,
however, Instruction No. 9A is not comparable to those issued in
Gonzales and Hamblin. Instruction No. 9A advised the jury that it
could find O'Bannon guilty of a specific result-based offense without
determining that he had the requisite intent or knowledge that his
conduct would cause that result. Thus, Instruction No. 9A improperly
allowed the jury to find O'Bannon guilty without the required proof
that he intentionally or knowingly caused the victim's serious physical
injuries. In this case, however, Instruction No. 9A is not comparable
to those issued in Gonzales and Hamblin. Instruction No. 9A advised
the jury that it could find O'Bannon guilty of a specific result-based
offense without detennining that he had the requisite intent or
knowledge that his conduct would cause that result. Thus, Instruction
No. 9A improperly allowed the jury to find 0 1Bannon guilty without
the required proof that he intentionally or knowingly caused the
victim's serious physical injuries.
3
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O'Bannon, 274 P.3d at

i1

38. The defendant's contention is that this language is

directly applicable to the instant matter.
The State is likewise incorrect in its assertion that the defendant can show no
prejudice. See Br. St. 34-35. It should be remembered that it was the alleged
victim who initiated the fight when she lunged out of her chair and hit the
defendant in the eye. R.1129:85. She herself testified that she bit the defendant on
the finger. R.1128:109. When she bit his finger and would not let go, R.1129:91,
the defendant acted reasonably in self-defense, and the only reason he hit her head
against the book shelf was to get her to release her bite. R.1129:92-94.
Accordingly, the jury should have been instructed that, to convict him of
third degree aggravated assault, it had to find not only that he acted intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly with regard to his conduct, but that he "intended, knew, or
was reckless with respect to whether the force he used was deadly force, likely to
cause serious bodily injury" and that "his desire" was "that [Janet] suffer bodily
injury."

Thus it was en-or to merely instruct the jury under a standard of

recklessness in using "other means or force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury." Instruction 38 (R.921); see Br. Aplt. p. 26 - 27. More was required
under the circumstances of this case.

4
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO REDUCE THE
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION.
The defendant's conviction for aggravated assault should have been reduced
to a class A misdemeanor. The defendant fully set forth his position in Point II of
his opening brief. Defendant's argues there that no meaningful distinction exists or
existed at the time between an act that is intended or likely to cause serious bodily
injury, but results only in substantial bodily injury, and an act that may have been
intended to cause serious bodily injury but results only in substantial bodily injury.
In either case the result is the same. Consequently, where such inherent ambiguity
exists within the statutory framework, as it does here, there is good reason to apply
the Shondel doctrine [State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343 , 453 P.2d 146 (1969)]
doctrine and, the defendant contends, thereby reduce his conviction to a class A
misdemeanor. See Br. Aplt., Point II, passim.
For a like reason, the defendant's position is that the rule of lenity applies,
the rule of lenity being "[t]he judicial doctrine holding that a com1, in construing
an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments,
should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment," State v.

Graham, 2011 UT App. 332,

~

16 , 263 P.3d 569 citing Black's Law Dictionary

1449 (9th ed. 2009).

5
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If, as the defendant contends, the statutory scheme is ambiguous, the
defendant should have been entitled to both the benefit of the Shondel doctrine and
the rule of lenity. His conviction therefore should have been reduced to a class A
misdemeanor. As the defendant's position is set forth at length in his opening
brief, further exposition of his position is unnecessary. See Br. Aplt. p. 31-38.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S
ARGUMENT THAT THE AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING ACQUITTAL IS
IRRECONCILABLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGGRAVATED
ASSAULT CONVICTION, wmcH IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT
REQUIRES REVERSAL AND REMAND.

The Defendant's claim is that the jury verdict of aggravated assault is
irreconcilable and fatally inconsistent with the jury's acquittal of the aggravated
kidnapping even though the victim testified as to all of the elements of that charge,
including that Defendant had used a dangerous weapon and that he had acted with
the intent to inflict bodily injury on or terrorize her. See Br. Aplt., p. 38-39.
The State cites no Utah authority for its assertion essentially that inconsistent
verdicts have no meaning. Br. St. p. 51 -52.

It cites sister states and the United

States Supreme Court for the proposition that "compromise" verdicts, and verdicts
where the jury may have weighed the evidence differently, simply portend that the
jury weighed the evidence for each count from a different perspective, or applied

6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lenity, or were simply mistaken. Id. citing United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57,
64-65 (1984 ).
The problem in the case at bar is that the jury verdicts are irreconcilably
inconsistent. See United States v. Powell, at 469 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1984). If the
verdicts are irreconcilable, as they are here, the case must be reversed and
remanded. If verdicts are both inconsistent and irreconcilable the jury's verdicts
must be overturned and the case remanded for appropriate action in light of the
circumstances. Holbrook v. Master Prat. Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 299-300 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) citing Alzado v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 752 P.2d 544, 554 (Colo.
1988).
In attempting to reconcile the inconsistent verdicts in this case, as was
argued in defendant's opening brief, this Comi would have to completely ignore
instruction number 34, R. 922.

With respect to the elements of aggravated

kidnapping, instruction number 34 instructed that in order to convict, the jury must
find Mr. Salt guilty of detaining or restraining Janet Guinn against her will. Such
detention and restraint is a fact to which she testified in detail, unequivocally, and
without any particular disagreement in the defendant's testimony. Br. Aplt. p. 3840.

She testified that in the process of attempting to leave, he grabbed her head

and gave her two sharp twists and told her he could not let her leave (R.1128: 106);
she was on the ground on her back and he was holding her down (R.1128:110);
7
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and that she told him this was "stupid" and to let her go, and he said "no" that he
could not let her go because she had ruined everything (R.1128:113). Id. In the
course of that detention, she further testified that he either possessed, used, or
threatened to use a dangerous weapon, a piece of pottery he used to hit her on the
head (R.1128:110); he struck her in the forehead with a lead pipe, causing bleeding
(R.1128: 114-116); he said he had a gun, Rl 128: 119; he injured her sufficiently to
cause her to go in and out of consciousness and she received stitches and 65 staples
to her head, R1128:131,200-04, and that he acted with the intent to inflict bodily
injury or teITorize her (which must have consisted of the aforementioned incidents
involved in the milieu of their struggle). The defendant was acquitted of this count
of aggravated kidnapping. R.939. Aggravated kidnapping is defined in salient part
as follows:
( 1)

An actor commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the
course of committing unlawful detention or kidnapping:(a) possesses,
uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 7 61-601.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302.

According to the alleged victim's testimony the

defendant threatened or used a dangerous weapon. Such an acquittal 1s
consequently entirely inconsistent and irreconcilable with a conviction of
aggravated assault.
On the other hand, the offense of aggravated assault, as set forth in
instruction 38, required the jury to find as elements 4 and 5 that Mr. Salt
8
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committed an act with unlawful force or violence that caused bodily injury to Janet
Guinn or created a substantial risk of bodily injury to Janet Guinn and that he did
so by using a dangerous weapon or other means of force likely to produce death or
serious bodily injury. R.926.
Mr. Salt contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, but also
that it is irreconcilably inconsistent for the jury to have acquitted him of the
aggravated kidnapping, but convict him of the aggravated assault.

This is

demonstrated by the verdict, of using, possessing, or threatening the use of a
dangerous weapon and of having the intent to inflict bodily injury or ten-orize Ms.
Guinn.

The absence of such evidence serves at the same time to negate the

element of aggravated assault, namely that he used a dangerous weapon and that he
acted with the goal of causing her bodily injury. Mr. Salt contends that lack of
proof of these elements rendered irreconcilable the acquittal of aggravated
kidnapping with the conviction for aggravated assault, requiring that the court
grant judgment of acquittal or a new trial.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE
DEFINITION OF "COHABITANT" IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
The defendant has thoroughly briefed this issue in its opening brief. See Br.
Aplt. Point IV. The State contends that Defendant's overbreadth challenge fails
because the challenged definition does not reach any constitutionally protected
9
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conduct. Defendant's vagueness challenge fails because, when considered in light
of the statute's purpose, the statute as a whole, and relevant case law, the
challenged definition gives adequate notice to ordinary people concerning what
behavior is covered. Br. St. p. 55.
It seems obvious that where the cohabitation statute references language
which brings within its embrace a party who "resides or has resided in the same
residency as the other party,"§ 78B-7-102(2) (West Supp. 2008); id.§ 77-36-1(1)
(defining "cohabitant" as having "same meaning as in Section 78B-7-102"), that
the party is engaged in the s01t of "intimate human relationship" referred to in

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), cited by the State. Br. St.
p. 58. "choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships
must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such
relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our
constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as
a fundamental element of personal liberty." Id. 468 U.S. 617-18. This is precisely
the sort of proscription against intrusion which invalidates the definitional section
of the cohabitant abuse statue wherein it refers to "resides or has resided in the
same residency as the other party."

§ 78B-7-102(2), supra. As the United States

Supreme Court recognized in Roberts,
(B)ecause the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it
must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly
10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from
unjustified interference by the State. Without precisely identifying
every consideration that may underlie this type of constitutional
protection, we have noted that certain kinds of personal bonds have
played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby
foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and
the power of the State. Moreover, the constitutional shelter afforded
such relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw much
of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others. Protecting
these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore
safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that is
central to any concept of liberty.

The personal affiliations that exemplify these considerations, and that
therefore suggest some relevant limitations on the relationships that
might be entitled to this sort of constitutional protection, are those
that attend the creation and sustenance of a family -- marriage; the
raising and education of children; and cohabitation with one's
relatives. Family relationships, by their nature, involve
deep
attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals
with whom one shares not only a special cmmnunity of thoughts,
experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's
life. Among other things, therefore, they are distinguished by such
attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in
decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from
ethers in critical aspects of the relationship. As a general matter, only
relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely to reflect the
considerations that have led to an understanding of freedom of
association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty. Conversely, an
association lacking these qualities -- such as a large business
enterprise -- seems remote from the concerns giving rise to this
constitutional protection. Accordingly, the Constitution undoubtedly
imposes constraints on the State's power to control the selection of
one's spouse that would not apply to regulations affecting the choice
of one's fellow employees.
Id, 468 U.S. 618-20 (Emphasis added; internal citations omitted).

11
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The "resides or resided together" language of the cohabitant abuse statute is
of the very essence of the s01t of personal affiliations that exemplify considerations
which secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of
certain kinds of highly personal relationships from which the First Amendment
secures "a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the
State." Id. 618. Consequently, it is unconstitutional in its overbreadth because
"(1) the statute 'reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct'
even if the statute also has a legitimate application" and "(2) the statute is not
'readily subject to a narrowing construction."' Provo City Corp. v. Thompson ,
2004 UT 14, 110, 86 P.3d 735(citations omitted); Br. St. p. 58.
This principle has nothing to do with the perpetration of "violent crime," as
the State asserts. Br. St. p. 59-60. It has to do with the right of individuals to
associate under the First Amendment, as reflected in Roberts. The fact that at
some distant time, an act of violence occurs between paities who have resided
together at one point hardly vitiates the basic principle that two persons may freely
associate without fear that that association will be subject to reprisal by the State
for some act between them at an unrelated later time.
Regarding the issue of unconstitutional vagueness, it could not be more
evident that the statute provides the opportunity for the State to engage in arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement. See Br. Aplt. p. 40-45. As this Court has stated,
12
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A statute can be "unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to the
facts of a given case." When asserting an as-applied challenge, the
party claims that, under the facts of his particular case, "the statute
was applied ... in an unconstitutional manner." Id. In contrast, "when
asserting a facial challenge, a party seeks to vindicate not only his
own rights, but those of others who may be adversely impacted by the
statute in question." In making a facial challenge, the challenger
asserts that the statute is so constitutionally flawed that 111 no set of
circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid."'

State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App 326,

,r

27, 100 P.3d 231, 239 (internal citations

omitted), cited by the State, Br. St. 56, 61, 65. The defendant has discussed the
facial versus "no set of circumstances" issues and standards in his opening brief
and will not repeat it here. Br. Aplt. p. 40-45. Suffice it to say that the definitions
of the cohabitant abuse statute are sufficiently vague and indefinite both on their
face and in application as to render the cohabitant abuse statute unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad. Neither on the face of the statute, nor as it is applied to the
defendant, nothing gives a reasonable understanding to the defendant or any
ordinary person that his contemplated conduct or association is proscribed.
More to the point of the issue, the statute should be facially invalidated as
overbroad because it inhibits the exercise of First Amendment freedom of
association rights where the impermissible applications of the law are substantial
"judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." City of Chicago v.

Morales, 527 U.S . 41 , 52, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1857, 144 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1999).

13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINTV
FAILING TO REQUEST AN ADDITIONAL ELEMENT ALLOWING THE JURY
TO CONSIDER MS. GUINN'S PRIOR ASSAULT AND ACT OF VIOLENCE
TOWARD THE DEFENDANT IN THE SELF-DEFENSE JURY INSTRUCTION
AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The State asserts that since the self-defense jury instruction in this case
infonned the jury that the factors there were "non-exclusive," its failure to
specifically include the alleged victim's acts of prior violence toward the defendant
as a factor did not preclude the jury from considering the prior violence toward
him in determining the reasonableness of his conduct. Consequently, the State
argues, the defendant cannot show either that counsel's decision not to challenge
the instruction constituted deficient performance or that he was prejudiced by
counsel's decision. Br. St. 65-66. This fails to attach the importance that the prior
violent acts deserve to the defendant's justifiable acts of self-defense.
The State points to other instructions given the jury which focused on the
State's burden of proof. Br. St. p. 67-68. But it fails to recognize, as was pointed
out by the defendant in his opening brief, that the particular factor which counsel
failed to include in Instruction 21, was a very key and critical element. "By failing
to request a very crucial element of self-defense, defense counsel allowed the State
a free pass in its burden to prove the defendant guilty. It has been held that when
obvious defenses are ignored in lieu of those which are ostensibly weaker, the
presumption of effective assistance of counsel may be overcome.

See, e.g., Gray
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v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (C.A.7 1986). Br. Aplt. p. 48. One cannot merely say
that since the State bears the heavy burden of proof, and the defendant no burden,
that leaving out a critical guidepost for the jury to consider is harmless error, where
self-defense is the defendant's entire defense.

Omitting the crucial element of

prior violence was a failure of substantial proportion. It is very likely that the jury,
because it was not informed of this critical factor, did not consider it.
The State makes much of the fact that other factors, which might not have
been helpful to the defendant, were also omitted. Br. St. p. 69. How this argument
is helpful to the analysis of this issue is not explained. The fact of the matter is,
counsel failed to include a key statutory element which the jury could and should
have considered, i.e., the alleged victim's prior violence. See Utah Code Ann. §
76-2-402.

The alleged victim's prior assaultive behavior was essential to

establishing self-defense, and counsel's failure to request this element was both
negligent and prejudicial.

This was conduct which fell below the standard of

practice required of defense counsel, failed to bring to bear the skill and expertise
required of counsel, and was therefore deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). As has been amply set fo11h in the defendant's opening
brief, it was highly prejudicial. Br. Aplt. p 46-49.
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The reasonable likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high to undennine
confidence in the verdict. See State v. King, 2010 UT App 396,

1 23, 248 P.3d

984. In this regard, it should be borne in mind precisely what the standard is:
(T)houghtful reflection suggests that confidence in the outcome may
be undermined at some point substantially short of the "more probable
than not" portion of the spectrum.

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913,920 (Utah 1987). The likelihood of a different result
was far short of "more probable than not" in this particular case. Counsel's error
created a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome sufficiently high to
undermine confidence in the verdict and require reversal and a new trial.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the defendant respectfully requests that this

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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